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MISCELLANEA  
 
 
 
 
 
A ROMANIAN TRIBUTE TO SHERMAN KENT  
 
MARIUS SEBE  
 
Whatever the complexities of the puzzles 
we strive to solve, and whatever the sophisticated 
techniques we may use to collect the pieces and 
store them, there can never be a time when the 
thoughtful man can be supplanted as the 
intelligence device supreme... Great discoveries 
are not made by second-rate minds, no matter how 
they may be juxtaposed organizationally. 
S h e r m a n  K e n t   
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
I shall start my paper with a simple question: Why do we need to know 
and understand the work of Sherman Kent? 
In a quick glimpse, my answer is the following: first of all, the 
Romanian intelligence establishment is looking for a way to meet the 
challenges of the new millennium, and towards this goal it needs a theory, a 
doctrine. In fact, we need our own doctrine in the intelligence field, 
especially given the new geopolitical, geo-economic, and geo-strategic 
environment of the 21
st
 Century. We have just passed the post-Cold War Era 
in the 21
st
 Century. Now, the old paradigms of the Cold War are gone, and 
their place was taken by a new intelligence pattern, governed by new 
paradigms, raised between the end of the 20
th
 Century and the beginning of 
the 21
st
. A second reason might be our need to identify the intelligence roots 
required for shaping our vision in this field, and especially for elaborating 
our strategy towards connecting to the future Global Intelligence 
Community
1
. These roots, which should be closely related to knowledge, 
may be precisely the Romanian contributions to social sciences (S. Haret, D. Gusti, 
                                                          
1  See the works of ROBERT DAVID STEELE, President of Open Source Solutions. Steele 
presents the idea of Global Intelligence Community in his works, Europe as Victim, Europe as Leader 
http://www.oss.net/extra/document/?module_instance=3&action=show_category&id=43&language_se
lection=0  
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A.D. Xenopol etc.), and the international contributions to the intelligence 
area. To us, that involves determining the best in class in the field, in the 
past and present, from a theoretical point of view, in order to establish a 
benchmarking process, enhance our intelligence knowledge, and develop our 
intelligence capital. 
Thus, this paper aims to be a humble Romanian tribute to Sherman 
Kent. I shall try to present his works and personality. At the same time, I 
shall let the reader discover the necessity of understanding the value of the 
intellectual efforts made in the intelligence field, and the importance of this 
field for a Nation-State, where the decision-makers are supposed to 
understand and apply rigorously the rules and principles of the strategic 
intelligence. 
 
 
Who was Sherman Kent? 
 
Exactly fifty four years ago, a history professor at the Yale University 
wrote an outstanding book for the American political establishment, and defined 
a new concept in the American lexicon of national security: strategic 
intelligence. Sherman Kent was one of the architects of the United States 
Intelligence Community. For nearly two decades, he was at the head of this 
esteemed machinery. Nowadays, we find that Kent came up with three major 
contributions to the Intelligence Community: (1) the book Strategic Intelligence 
for American World Policy, which he wrote before entering the Intelligence 
Community while he was still a history professor at the Yale University; (2) he 
strove throughout his career to imbue the intelligence field with a sense of 
professionalism, and as part of this effort he contributed to the establishment of 
the Central Intelligence Agency's professional journal
2
; (3) he proposed the 
foundation of an Institute for the Advanced Study of Intelligence, which became 
reality under the name of Center for the Study of Intelligence. 
Sherman Kent was born in Chicago, in 1903. He spent much of his 
childhood in California and Nevada. His father, William Kent, was a 
congressman elected three times as a California representative, such that 
Sherman lived in Washington from 1911 to 1919. 
After graduating from the Yale University, he received a PhD in history 
in 1933. Kent's specialization was electoral politics in the 19
th
-century‟s 
Bourbon France. Yale University Press published his first book, Electoral 
Procedures under Louis Philippe, in 1937.  
                                                          
2  In “Introduction” to Sherman Kent and the Board of National Estimates, Collected  
Essays, www.odci.gov/csi/books/shermankent/toc.html  
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After being a historian for all these years, Kent “was rescued from 
(one suspects) what ultimately would have proved to be an unsatisfying 
teaching career at Yale by the imminent entry of the United State into World 
War II”3.   
During World War II Kent served in, and became (in January 
1943) Chief of the Europe-Africa Division of the Research and 
Analysis Branch of the Office of Strategic Studies (OSS), a direct 
predecessor of today‟s National Foreign Assessment Center (NFAC) 
of CIA. His background in history and the intelligence work within 
OSS were completed as staff of the National War College, before his 
return to Yale in 1947. 
In a single decade Kent accumulated such knowledge and 
experience that he was able to transform them into “strategic 
intelligence”. In 1947-1948 he received a Guggenheim Fellowship to 
write his referential book Strategic Intelligence for American World 
Policy. The book was printed by Princeton Press, reprinted in 1951, 
1953, and published as a revised (paperback) edition in 1966. Talking 
about this book, Ford believes that it is “certainly the most influential 
book of its kind yet to appear”4. And William Jackson (a former OSS 
officer himself) said: “it is the best general book so far on any aspect of 
intelligence; this book should be read by all high officials charged with 
responsibility for the security of the country and by all those who work in 
the field of intelligence”5. 
In late 1950 Kent joined the CIA, to become the deputy chief of the 
newly created Office of National Estimates (ONE). Before him other 
civilian specialists joined this structure, and among them William Langer, 
the Harvard diplomatic historian who was Kent‟s superior at the OSS' 
Research and Analysis Branch. This movement and others were caused by 
“the difficulties US Intelligence had had in calling the North Korean 
invasion of the South in June 1950, and especially the massive Chinese 
involvement that autumn”6, or what Rose called “two strategic intelligence 
blunders within six months”7, both of which lead to a major shake-up of 
CIA‟s analytic process. At the time, the intelligence system of the US didn‟t 
have an analytical entity specialized in producing the national intelligence as 
a synthesis of the vast, often highly technical, knowledge possessed by the 
                                                          
3  Ibidem. 
4  HAROLD P. FORD, A Tribute to Sherman Kent, www.odci.gov/csi/books/shermankent/1tribute.html  
5  WILLIAM H. JACKSON, New York Times Book Review, 1 May 1949, in the same 
article, A Tribute to Sherman Kent.  
6  HAROLD P. FORD, op.cit. 
7  P.K. ROSE, “Perceptions and Reality. Two Strategic Intelligence Mistakes in Korea, 
1950”, in Studies in Intelligence. Journal of the American Intelligence Professional, 11, 2001, 
Unclassified Edition.  
 60 
agencies that made up the U.S. Intelligence Community
8
. That is why, after 
some intelligence failures and fierce disputes at the higher ranks of the 
political decision takers, President Truman nominated Lt.Gen. Walter Bedell 
Smith, US Army, to replace Hillenkoetter as Director of Central Intelligence 
(DCI), mandating him for a complete overhaul of the agency. “Beetle” 
Smith brought together Langer and Kent into the Company, to put its 
analytical house in order. Thus, they were to preside over a reorientation of 
the analytical components of the CIA
9
.  
The result was the Office of National Estimates, with a research arm in the 
Office of Research and Reports. Langer became the head of the Office of National 
Estimates and chairman of the Board of National Estimates, which in turn was 
responsible for producing the NIE‟s (National Intelligence Estimates), a new 
finished form of intelligence. Kent served as Langer‟s Deputy until January 1952, 
when, upon Langer‟s return to Harvard, he succeeded Langer as head of ONE. He 
held that position until 31 December 1967.  
 
 
What is Strategic Intelligence? 
 
Simply put, this concept is formed by two important concepts of military 
origin: strategy and intelligence. Consequently, any study on these subjects 
requires a military context anchorage. 
For the concept of strategy we need to get at the root of the military 
thinking. Strategy means the science or art of military command, as applied to 
the general planning and conduct of full scale combat operations. Strategy is 
thus by definition a plan to achieve some given end
10
. Other traditional views
11
 
on strategy include: 
 Strategy as a coherent and unifying pattern for decision making, 
a blueprint for a whole organization defining an explicit road map for the 
future. 
 Strategy as a means of defining purpose in terms of long range 
objectives, actions, programs, and priorities for resource allocation, 
aligning short term action and resource deployment to be congruent with 
longer term objectives. 
                                                          
8  The term Intelligence Community is used here to describe the collectivity of U.S. 
Intelligence from World War II onward; this term did not come into use until the mid-1950s or later.  
9  In “Introduction” to Sherman Kent and the Board of National Estimates, Collected 
Essays, www.odci.gov/csi/books/shermankent/toc.html  
10  Ibidem.  
11  RICK SIDOROWICZ, The Concept of Strategy – beyond Strategic Planning, 
Competia Inc., http://www.competia.com/bpubs/Refresher/31-strategicplanning.html 
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 Strategy as a response to external opportunities and threats, and to 
internal strengths and weaknesses, to achieve a long term sustainable competitive 
advantage; a viable match between internal capabilities and the external 
environment; and adapting to meet the demands of a changing environment. 
 Strategy as a means of defining an organization's competitive 
domain including defining the business, segmentation and positioning, 
and how and where it is going to compete.  
 
Now, there is a direct and fundamental link between an organization's 
strategy and its intelligence activities, since intelligence is: 
 
the knowledge – and, ideally, foreknowledge – sought by nations in response to 
external threats and to protect their vital interests, especially the well-being of their own people12.  
 
At the same time, Kent described intelligence as:  
 
the knowledge [and foreknowledge] upon which we base our high-level national 
policy toward the other states of the world13.  
 
This knowledge must meet four tests
14
: (a) it must be complete; (b) it must 
be accurate; (c) it must be timely; (d) it must be “capable of serving as a basis for 
action”15. That's why any strategy would have to rely on intelligence that 
“operates based on three distinct principles”16: (1) support for senior decision 
makers in their capacities as strategists; (2) the monitoring and analysis of issues 
or key topics that matter to strategy; (3) coordination at the corporative center.  
On the other hand, defining the intelligence concept requires a broader 
approach, having in mind that “errors of definition lead to errors of strategy”. 
Because such an approach would require lots of time and space, I will only 
mention here Warner's successful attempt in this direction, who concludes, after 
a thorough analysis, that “intelligence is secret, state activity to understand or 
influence foreign entities”17. 
                                                          
12  LYMAN B. KIRKPATRICK, JR., “Intelligence”, in Bruce W. Jentelson and Thomas 
G. Paterson (eds.), Encyclopedia of US Foreign Realtions, 2, Oxford University Press, 1997, p. 365.  
13  SHERMAN KENT, Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy, Princeton 
University Press, 1949.  
14  DOUGLAS BERNHARDT, “Strategic Intelligence: the Sword and the Shield of the 
Enterprise”, in Competitive Intelligence Magazine, 5, 5, 2002.  
15  SHERMAN KENT, op.cit. 
16  Corporate Executive Board, 2000 – Strategic Intelligence: Providing Critical 
Information for Strategic Decisions. Washington, DC: Corporate Strategy Board, in DOUGLAS 
BERNHARDT, art.cit. 
17  MICHAEL WARNER, “Understanding Our Craft. Wanted: A Definition of 
Intelligence”, in Studies in Intelligence, Journal of the American Intelligence Professional, 46, 3, 
2002, Unclassified Edition.  
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Strategic Intelligence was viewed by Kent as a triple of intelligence definitions: 
 Intelligence is knowledge – the knowledge our state must 
possess regarding other states in order to assure itself that its cause will 
not suffer nor its undertakings fail because its statesman and soldiers plan 
and act in ignorance. 
 Intelligence is organization – intelligence is an institution; it is a 
physical organization of living people which pursues the special kind of 
knowledge at issue. 
 Intelligence is activity – the word intelligence is used not 
merely to designate the types of knowledge I have been discussing and 
the organization to produce this knowledge, it is used as a synonym for 
the activity which the organization performs. 
 
However, the strategic intelligence activities are quite old Government or 
State practices, which some managed to master better than others. For example, 
in the ancient world, the Carthaginians were especially skilled in developing 
intelligence on their adversaries, as were their forbearers, the Phoenicians, and 
other trading states of the eastern Mediterranean Sea. 
In the 15
th
 Century, the Italian city-states started to establish permanent 
embassies in foreign capitals. The Venetians used such outposts as intelligence 
sources, and even developed codes and ciphers by which information could be 
secretly communicated
18
.  
In the 16
th
 Century's Europe, these activities were guided towards specific 
target groups, like political dissidents or religious groups. 
In the 17
th
 and 18
th
 Centuries the governments started practicing such 
strategic intelligence activities in an attempt to approach global issues in a more 
systematic manner. 
In the 19
th
 and 20
th
 Centuries major shifts are taking place in modern 
power politics and intelligence systems. National intelligence systems are 
forced to categorize intelligence, which is classified in three categories: 
strategic (sometimes called national), tactical, and counterintelligence. 
Strategic Intelligence became the broadest category, on the one hand 
because of European state powers promoting world and regional politics, 
characterized by the pursuit of imperialist foreign policies, and, on the other 
hand, because of the advances of the military and communication technologies. 
Kent‟s vision on strategic intelligence has some of its origins in the geo-
strategic environment of that time, when: 
 
because of the peculiar nature of the Cold War, American leaders would have to 
learn the skills necessary for protecting US interests in situations short of war but also 
                                                          
18  Encyclopedia Britannica – A Brief History of Intelligence, www.britannica.com  
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short of true peace. A key requirement for American security in this new era, wrote Kent, 
was strategic intelligence.19  
 
It is important to point out two of the main characteristics of Kent‟s 
strategic intelligence works. First, from a scientific point of view, the American 
intelligence specialist perceived strategic intelligence as a social science. 
Second, from a functional point of view, he elaborated a comprehensive concept 
to enhance the American national power, and support the American world policy. 
Kent saw strategic intelligence as a social science applied to the existence 
and prosperity of the Nation-State. He also strove to turn intelligence analysis 
into a rigorous science: “we insist, and have insisted for generations, that truth 
is to be approached, if not attained, through research guided by a systematic 
method. In the social sciences, which very largely constitute the subject matter 
of strategic intelligence, there is such a method. It is not the same method but it 
is a method nonetheless.”20 The idea that analysts should use some variation of 
the scientific method to create intelligence analysis is crucial throughout all of 
Kent‟s work. 
Even though we are now witnessing a shift of paradigm in the 
intelligence process, which changed in the last decade from a linear structure to 
a star-shaped one (the centric-network intelligence), Kent's vision on the 
methodology of the information processing that are approximating the scientific 
method are still in place. 
At the same time, Kent‟s intelligence work was refined by other specialists 
during the last decades. As the intelligence writer Washington Platt noted in 1957: 
“The so-called „scientific method‟ means different things to different people, but the 
basic features are much the same. These features are: collection of data, formation 
of hypothesis, testing the hypothesis, and drawing conclusions based on the 
foregoing, which can be used as reliable sources of prediction.”21  
The second characteristic is related to the Nation-State‟s intelligence, 
which was seen “to the depth and breadth of its being”. 
To us, this vision is not unknown. The Romanian sociologist Dimitrie 
Gusti wrote some ten years before Kent about the meaning of Nation‟s Science, 
and about the Sociology of the Nation and the War. The main difference 
between the two visions is that Kent‟s was an offensive conception, while 
Gusti‟s was essentially defensive in its nature. 
Kent stressed out that strategic intelligence should have two uses: a 
protective one and an outgoing one, both of which should play a supportive role 
                                                          
19  BRUCE BERKOVITZ and ALLAN GOODMAN, Strategic Intelligence for American 
National Security, Princeton University Press, 1989, p. 3.  
20  SHERMAN KENT, op.cit., p. 156.  
21  WASHINGTON PLATT, Strategic Intelligence Production: Basic Principles, 
Frederick A. Praeger, New York, 1957, p. 75.  
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in any confrontation between Nation-States, at peace and at war. He embedded 
strategic intelligence in a conceptual framework providing better evaluative 
measures of foreign countries which are likely to become potential competitors. 
The purpose of this framework was to direct the American “peacetime policy 
toward maintenance of peace and national security”, and for “remembering that 
we might be thrust into a war which we must win”22.  
Strategic intelligence is applied to the discovery of what Kent called a 
Nation’s strategic stature, that is, not just the means the Nation possess to wage 
war, but also its potential for war:  
 the resources that are available, or might be made available 
(population, industrial plants, transportation network); 
 the political and social structure, their stability, and “the moral 
quality of the people and their strengths of values”, their willingness to be 
mobilized for war and the reasons for which they would fight; 
 the political leadership, their strength and “genius (or want of it) 
for organizing men and materials into a community of life and strength”23. 
 
In thinking about intelligence, Kent had an outstanding vision compared 
to all other previous intelligence attempts because he actually links strategy to 
intelligence to national power. In other words, his contribution consists in 
applying thinking about strategy and national power to an ordered conception of 
intelligence analysis as an intellectual discipline
24
. The outcome of this 
conception was the exceptional evolution of the American intelligence 
establishment for the next fifty years.  
 
 
“The Need for Intelligence Literature” 
 
The Need for Intelligence Literature is the title of a paper Kent wrote in 
1955, and the second important trend eventually set by his efforts in the 
development of the intelligence structures. Reading this article, I was astonished 
both by its simplicity and by the depth of the truth it establishes. I felt this 
especially since I positively perceived all these obstacles, and at the same time 
potential opportunities for the development of the intelligence field, during the 
last decade, while I worked as a defense intelligence officer. 
                                                          
22  SHERMAN KENT, op.cit., p. 61.  
23  HS/HC-7 CIA Progress Report; Office of National Estimates (ONE) Section I 
“Intelligence and the Problem of National Foreign Policy”, 26 December 1951, p. 2 (This 
document has not yet been declassified) – from “Introduction” to Sherman Kent and the Board of 
National Estimates, Collected  Essays, www.odci.gov/csi/books/shermankent/toc.html  
24  In “Introduction” to Sherman Kent and the Board of National Estimates, Collected 
Essays, www.odci.gov/csi/books/shermankent/toc.html  
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Any discipline without literature risks to cease growing and fail to 
accomplish its objectives. To Kent, this was a matter of greatest importance: 
 
As long as this discipline lacks a literature, its method, its vocabulary, its body of 
doctrine, and even its fundamental theory run the risk of never reaching full maturity. I 
will not say that you cannot have a discipline without a literature, but I will assert that you 
are unlikely to have a robust and growing discipline without one.25 
 
That‟s why Kent‟s merit in this area is twofold. On the one hand he noticed 
this necessity inside the American intelligence establishment, and, on the other hand, 
he was one of its proponents during the Cold War. In this respect, Ford underlines:  
 
in a more profound sense, the idea of Studies in Intelligence did not of course 
suddenly strike Sherm out of the blue, one Sunday in 1953, but sprang from a long and 
intensely held conviction that intelligence should be recognized and treated as a scholarly 
discipline, and to that end intelligence badly needed a professional literature26.  
 
Kent fought to impose intelligence as a distinctive discipline and to enhance the 
intellectual and theoretical bases demanded by the intelligence as a profession. 
One Sunday in December 1953, when he had the morning duty in Mr. 
Dulles‟s office, Kent wrote a memorandum about how a major flaw in the 
intelligence business (its lack of a systematic literature) might be corrected. 
Every intelligence agency has hundreds or thousands of specialists and expert 
personnel, but very few of them are actually able to find, discover, and 
encapsulate in writing the values that might enhance the intelligence work, 
that is, the variables and parameters that might be analyzed and improved in 
the intelligence field. In any intelligence agency these people are sometimes 
simply not discovered. Sometimes, tidy-minded leaders and domestic rivalries 
stupidly ignore them. Kent was definitely one of these people, and he not only 
worked in the intelligence analysis field, but he had the eye, brain and analytic 
scrutiny for enhancing intelligence discipline and transforming it to a 
honorable and special profession. His memorandum is simple but 
exceptionally loaded with values.  It is somewhat outdated today, but it is still 
true for every Nation-State, and especially for those Nation-States that are 
evolving towards democracy. He wrote: 
 
what I am talking about is a literature dedicated to the analysis of our many-sided 
calling, and produced by its most knowledgeable devotees. The sort of literature I am 
talking about is of the nature of house organ literature, but much more. You might call it 
the institutional mind and memory of our discipline. When such a literature is produced, it 
does many things to advance the task.27 
                                                          
25  SHERMAN KENT, The Need for Intelligence Literature, www.odci.gov/csi/books/shermankent/toc.html  
26  HAROLD P. FORD, op.cit.  
27  SHERMAN KENT, The Need for Intelligence Literature.  
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Kent‟s prewar academic experience was the main factor in his developing 
of the American intelligence literature and research area. His view was clear: 
any discipline without research cannot be developed, and intelligence, like 
many other disciplines, such as chemistry, or medicine, or economics, needs the 
accumulation of empirical knowledge and methodological experience from one 
generation to the next
28
. 
His proposal to establish an organization as an intelligence research 
institute was never fulfilled, but in 1975 the Center for the Study of Intelligence 
was founded, inspired at least in part by Kent‟s concept of an Institute for the 
Advanced Study of Intelligence. Besides, in 1998 the Central Intelligence 
Agency created the Sherman Kent School for Intelligence Analysis, in order to 
increase the expertise of intelligence officers within its Directorate of 
Intelligence, responsible for the production of finished intelligence analysis. I 
mentioned the timeline of the evolution of these institutions in order to outline 
Kent‟s vision about this special field. Even though his proposal for a research 
institute has not become reality in the 50‟s, the idea was proved to be correct in 
the next decades. In fact, the establishment of the research culture in the 
intelligence field is the result of the efforts in the late 40‟s and 50‟s of this 
visionary man. 
 
 
The importance of Kent’s work for the intelligence communities of 
the new democratic societies 
 
Why is Kent‟s work so important to the new intelligence communities? 
Any intelligence specialist or politician reading Kent‟s book will most 
certainly find lots of theoretical and practical ideas for their activity. I shall 
point out only two of them. 
First, there is the value of the concepts. This is probably a most important 
point. Every discipline works with concepts which have to be the same for all of 
its specialists. The vagueness or absence of definitions of the concepts can lead 
to flawed approaches to knowledge, organization, and actions. The lack of 
professional culture in any field leads to the lack of good organizations and 
actions. We cannot build a strong culture without designing an intelligence 
doctrine and theory related to the 21
st
 Century environment. Towards this goal, 
we need to understand the difference between information and intelligence, 
because we have a big problem in this area: the absence of the word 
“intelligence” from the Romanian vocabulary. In my opinion, a superficial 
approach to this field from the theoretical point of view stands little chance to 
lead us to the right direction.  
                                                          
28  Ibidem.  
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It is astonishing that the specialists who discovered this anomaly came 
from outside the intelligence community
29. I‟m not claiming that nobody has 
noticed this negative situation from inside the intelligence community. But the 
Romanian intelligence specialists haven‟t written  about that issue for more than 
a decade. To the Romanian specialists, any process performed by special 
services has data and information as input, and also information as output. This 
theory is simply amazing. I do believe that something has to be rethought here. 
I also believe that gaps in a language can lead to a lack of progress in the 
disciplines were concepts are lacking. During the last decade for example, some 
concepts were missing in the economics field. Thanks to the open-mindedness 
of the academic community however, words like management and marketing 
have been adapted to the Romanian vocabulary. In contrast, the Romanian 
intelligence community was not able to enhance their knowledge by adapting 
any new concept, mainly because of their obsession with secrecy. This problem 
is not specific to us; rather, it is specific to secret services in general. The 
difference is that some of these organizations are adapting their knowledge 
searches faster than others. As noted by Kent himself, there are big differences 
between academic and intelligence organizations in the knowledge field: 
 
… many of the most important contributions to this literature need not be 
classified at all.  
 
The plain fact is that „security‟ and the advance of knowledge are in fundamental 
conflict. The only reason we get anywhere is because we do not demand either perfect 
security or unlimited debate about secrets of state. We do get somewhere because the 
necessity for compromise at both ends is well and fully understood.30 
 
Second point is the understanding of the meaning of intelligence, and the 
huge potential of designing a benchmarking process from a theoretical point of 
view. In the development of the new intelligence communities, the specialists 
were easily lead to a new approach, by defining a clear status of intelligence. 
This consists in answering a few questions: what are the targets, range of 
interest to be served, function to be served, and departments and agencies 
concerned, beside of either positive intelligence or security intelligence. 
Kent's model can support the new democratic states in analyzing and 
taking general decisions regarding: (1) which of the intelligence functions
31
 
should be implemented, and how much of the country's resources should be 
                                                          
29  From outside the intelligence environment it is Dan Pavel who has written about this 
subject. He is professor at the Political Science Faculty – University of Bucharest.  
30  SHERMAN KENT, The Need for Intelligence Literature.  
31  The four elements of intelligence are clandestine collection, analysis and estimates, 
covert action and counterintelligence – GLENN P. HASTEDT, Controlling Intelligence, Frank 
Cass, London, 1991, p. 6.  
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allocated to that purpose; (2) the balance between civilian and military 
intelligence organizations; (3) the relationship between intelligence and policy 
(of course, this also involves the issue of coordination among the intelligence 
organizations)
32
.  
 
 
Closing remarks 
 
More than five decades since their publishing, Kent‟s works are still 
valuable, especially to the Nation-States lacking a mature institutional memory, 
doctrine, and theory in the intelligence field. 
I felt that it is important to write about Kent because the new challenges 
in the international defense and security environment require new approaches to 
the intelligence discipline. These challenges can be addressed only by a strong 
and mature discipline based on strong and mature doctrinal and theoretic 
foundations.  
This is why Kent‟s work on intelligence may stand as a model, as roots 
for a new approach to intelligence, but on the same pattern in principles. We 
have to adapt this intelligence pattern to our needs taking into account the new 
paradigmatic shifts. 
Also, we have been witnessing important changes in the intelligence 
process and organization, and we have to adapt our intelligence strategy to 
them. These are in fact the three levels found by Kent in his book, and they are 
still viable today: intelligence is knowledge, intelligence is organization, and 
intelligence is activity.  
                                                          
32  The reader could find these three aspects elaborated by THOMAS C. BRUNEAU, 
“Controlling Intelligence in New Democracies”, in International Journal of Intelligence and 
Counterintelligence, 14, 3, 2001. 
